I approach Hong's film from the perspective that Heidegger's philosophy cannot be divorced from his politics, separated from the historical moment, the attunement of the times. However, we must be careful when bandying about the term, 'political,' for I contend that in order to understand the intimate connection between politics and Heidegger's philosophy, it is necessary to first be clear about exactly what Heidegger meant when writing and speaking about 'politics.' Heidegger was not concerned immediately with the science of governing a nation by means of state-founding or bureaucratic activities, rooted in the laws of a nation's constitution, which expressed the all-encompassing, unwavering 'core values' of its political activity. Rather, Heidegger's conception of the political was in many ways reminiscent of the early Greeks. It was primordial and ontological, and this notion is expressed in the so-called controversial writings of the 1930s, e.g., in the 1934-35 lectures, Hölderlin's Hymns 'Germania' and 'The 12.2 September 2008 Magrini, James (2008) Rhine,' Heidegger writes of the originary community that precedes all reciprocal relationships, and in the 1935 lecture course, Introduction to Metaphysics Heidegger writes of the polis as the originary ontological site of Being as history, which first manifests the potential for all things political.
Heidegger sought to return to the understanding of Being as experienced by such early Pre-Platonic thinkers as Parmenides and Heraclitus, which was obscured and covered over, according to Heidegger, in great part because the original Greek experience of Being was literally lost in translation, i.e., the Roman Latin mistranslation of the original Greek authors. In Being and Time, Section 44 (1927) , Heidegger is already writing on the marked difference between the notion of truth in the Western tradition of metaphysics and that of the early Greeks. The tradition understands the locus of truth to reside in the locution, the proposition, and the essence of truth to be the agreement between subject and object. Against this notion, Heidegger reveals through etymology a more primordial (Greek) notion of truth as aletheia, which translates as the event of 'un-covering,' or bringing out of 'concealment.' According to Heidegger, modernity had fallen away from the potential for this authentic way of understanding politics, history (as 'historicality'), and destiny. Because of the influence of Platonic metaphysics, religion (Christianity), and scientific positivism, those of modernity failed to grasp the philosophical import of the legitimate ontological understanding of Being qua Being . Heidegger believed that asking and answering the question, 'How does it stand with Being?' determined the concealed essence of human history, inspiring the authentic unfolding of a people's (Germany's) destiny through ontologically inspired political comportment. For Heidegger, politics was first and foremost authentic philosophical activity, grounded in the search for ontological understanding and the (lost) experience of truth (aletheia) radically dissimilar to the notion of truth as defined in terms of the correspondence model. Such philosophical activity revealed 'the Greek conception of the essence of Being -a definiteness that has not come to us from just anywhere, but which has long ruled over our [German] historical Dasein' (Heidegger 2000, 96-97) . understanding of the creative use of documentary. Nichols believes that documentary, as a concept or practice, is not restricted to occupying a single, fixed territory: 'It mobilizes no finite inventory of techniques, addresses no set number of issues and adopts no completely known taxonomy of forms, styles, or modes' (Nichols 1991, 17) . The film erupts with the hauntingly cryptic words of the 6 th -century Greek philosopher, Heraclitus, 'the obscure one,' bringing the spectator face to face with the archaic, strange, and beautiful language of the Greeks, a language still rich with untapped potential. The raw and violent treatment of the quotation through editing and effects suggests the primordial power that these ancient words have to keep interpreters at bay due to their overwhelming depth, a depth which Heidegger attempts to plumb with his radical brand of etymology in order to bring to presence the essence of this fragment, which emerges from the original moment of philosophy's long and much debated history.
Functioning as the arena for the confrontation (Auseinandersetzung) between the languages of Greek and German, the film traces the chronological development of
Heidegger's interpretation of Heraclitus (and the Greeks) through the philosophy of the 1930s. The interplay of the Greek and German expresses the all-important link for
Heidegger between these two languages of primordial power. He approaches the Greek in order to think and say anew the original Greek experience of Being. We approach Heidegger's originary notion of politics by first examining the quotation that opens the film, which translates as such:
War (polemos) is both king and father of all things, and it has revealed some as gods and others as men; some it has made slaves, others free. (Freeman 1983, 29) Commonly, this passage is thought to connote life as a dynamic process of struggle and continual change, as birth, growth, and degeneration occur in the war (polemos) between opposing life forces. Heidegger's interpretation of "war," or polemos, reveals something far beyond the immediate connotation of this passage, that of representing the ongoing "earthly" struggle of humans, which directs the ebb and flow of history. Instead, Heidegger (Kracauer 1960, 208) . colored, she is utterly enveloped by melancholic 'homesickness,' and with it, the longing to return home, to be at home. This for Heidegger is the fundamental attunement of philosophy, and all philosophical questioning originates in this moment when humans are grasped and seized by a mode of attunement in such a way that they are 'first able to conceptually comprehend, and are first able to grasp the matter of the inquiry' (Heidegger 1999, 9) .
To return to the notion of phusis as earlier introduced, Walter Brogan defines phusis in a three-fold manner: (1) phusis for the early Greeks is appearing, it allows beings to present themselves in their own self-showing, as this or that, as accessible or inaccessible;
(2) phusis is a becoming that is not separated off from Being, as in Plato's philosophy, designated as 'inauthentic Being,' but the originary 'happening' by which things 'shine forth'; (3) most importantly, phusis happens as polemos, there is a 'primordial struggle that first draws beings out of concealment and lets them stand forth as such and such, i.e., as having determinate characteristics in relation to each other in a field of relations and differences,' and this concept for Heidegger of meaningful relations becomes Dasein's world (Brogan et al 2006, 39) . As Heidegger reasons, the aboriginal struggle of Being and the subsequent emergence of beings, 'first projects and develops the un-heard, the hitherto un-said and un-thought,' allowing that which 'essentially unfolds to step apart in opposition, first allows [for the possibility of ] position, status, and rank to establish themselves in coming-to-presence' (Heidegger 2000, 65/47) .
The unfolding of Being, however, is not independent of human activity altogether, but it is phusis and the manner in which the overwhelming unfolds (as polemos) that firsts allows those who struggle to emerge and carry on the struggle in works of art, philosophy, and state-building. It is only when Dasein enters, or is drawn into, the struggle with phusis by the necessity to understand and create its historical world and existence that its authentic destiny is possible. Through Dasen's works of art, 'the sway, phusis, first comes to stand in what comes-to-presence. Beings as such first come into being. This becoming-aworld is authentic history' (Heidegger 2000, 65/47) . However, it is important to note that the activities of the poet, philosopher, and statesman, if they are authentic, depend on the relationship to Being, from which these activities acquire their power. It is from this concept that we discover what Heidegger means when speaking of originary "politics" as I I I . The Cr it ic al Confr ont at ion (A useinander set z ung) wit h Gr eek A nt iquit y and t he Wor l dl y " P ol it ic s" of t he Thir d R eic h
The film is not only concerned with the confrontation between the languages of Greek and German, it also presents the confrontation between two distinct political philosophies: the worldly politics of the Third Reich (and Western Europe) and Heidegger's originary politics as described. In fact, the film engages in hermeneutics. It seeks to understand the issue of Heidegger and Nazism through the categories of language and ontology, and ultimately, to interpret, or translate, Heidegger's philosophy. For Heidegger, we must note that interpretation and translation are interrelated, e.g., with respect to the translation of a language (and the same idea applies to the 'translation' of a philosophy), one word cannot simply stand in for another, functioning as a substitute for that word.
Rather, translation-interpretation is the movement 'from the spirit of one language onto that of another' (Heidegger 1996, 62) . It brings to light the hidden connections that are present in the translated language, but are not explicitly set forth in it. 'From this,' writes Heidegger, 'we can recognize that all translating must be interpreting,' and the reverse is Heidegger interprets the Greeks with the purpose of "coming to be at home," i.e., finding Germany's proper heritage by way of a "passage through the foreign." As Heidegger reasons,
[I]f the becoming homely of a particular humankind sustains the historicality of its history, then the law of encounter [Auseinandersetzung] between the foreign and one's own is the fundamental truth of history, a truth from out of which the essence of history must unveil itself (49). These questions are all unusually difficult, and basically inaccessible to common understanding. A long headache and a rather critical confrontation with the great tradition are needed. One of the great dangers of our thinking today is precisely that thinking, particularly philosophical thinking, no longer has a real, primordial relation to the tradition. deal with Heidegger, to interpret-translate his thought. For example, the National Socialists were neither spiritually nor intellectually equipped to ascend to the heights of his philosophy.
As stated, Heidegger envisaged the National Socialist movement as a new German beginning that would inspire the revolutionary historicizing of Germany, which would occur through a critical encounter with the Greeks, their language, thought, and heritage as revealed for appropriation and repetition, grounded in the return to the primordial relationship to Being. As John Caputo writes, 'In the primordial Greek beginning he would make plain to all the spiritual authority of National Socialism as the true future and destiny of Germany, Europe, of the West' (Caputo et al 1999, 53) . The beginning Heidegger envisaged (the 'other beginning') was not in any way a faux encounter with classicism, a revival of the art, architecture, and politics of either Greece or imperial Rome For according to Heidegger, the Nazis carelessly confused Germany's authentic historical destiny with 'the superficiality of subjective values' (Ibid, 54). The 'inner truth' and 'greatness of the movement,' if such truth and greatness did exist for Heidegger, was to be found in the conception of politics that was both spiritual and metaphysical, for it is only when the philosopher, poet, and statesman are responsible to the call of Being that a political order, which stands above and beyond all human laws, has the potential to emerge (Ibid, 53).
Heidegger's philosophy does not argue for the existence of universal principles of reason or morality, which inform human 'essence' or dictate the legitimacy of the human morals (the is and the ought). However, Heidegger is in no way a nihilist, rather, in turning his attention to the question of Being, he allows Being (as phusis) to intimate measure and the positions of status and rank through its own higher law, i.e., the 'higher law of Being as history' (Sluga et al 2001, 200) . the higher law of Being in the moment of the clashing of world and Earth, the 'work-being' of the art work. As 'world reveals itself, it submits to the decisions of an historical humanity the question of victory, defeat, blessing and curse, mastery and slavery' (Heidegger 1971, 63) .
It is this notion of tragedy as work of art manifesting values for the polis that inspires the film's hermeneutic to fold, or "spiral," back to readdress and reinterpret the words of The "other beginning" of which Heidegger wrote was an event that required an ongoing battle, history must continually be fought for and won, over and again. The thinker, poet, and statesman were not merely to initiate Germany's authentic beginning in the confrontation with the Greeks, they were also, and perhaps more important, required to continually put that beginning into question to assure the dynamic progress of Germany and the West. In the new beginning of history, as Heidegger contends, the path that is eventually marked out experiences a breakdown and progress inevitably grinds to a halt.
According to Caputo, 'Once things stabilize, they fall in decline and require still another revolutionary struggle and retrieval' (Caputo et al 1999, 68 (Caputo et al 1999, 68) .
Perhaps this represents a legitimate way to initiate a political revolution, but it is no way to guarantee its continued stability and lasting influence. Heidegger's 'beginning' was more than National Socialism could tolerate, Heidegger's ontological notion of politics was not the type of politics that would ever inform the Third Reich. While they relied on
Heidegger's political loyalty, they were not interested in adopting his philosophy as the grounding and guiding intellectual force of the movement. The Nazis were not interested in reading Heraclitus. As Caputo correctly concludes, it seems to me that they were quite right to be troubled about all this talk about the questionabilty of Being, the groundless abyss beneath whatever we call a ground, the nothing which "nothings," which withdraws and leaves us empty. They were right about his thought, more so than he himself was, although they barely understood a word he said. (65) Heidegger was undoubtedly dissatisfied with the official position of the party. Conflicts with staff and party members led to his resignation as rector of Freiburg University in April of 1934. As Michael Inwood writes, 'Although he did not leave the party, he took no further significant part in political affairs [...] he claimed that he became disillusioned with Nazism after the Röhm putsch' (Inwood 1996, 4 is always inferior to the necessity of history's law.
I V. Conc l uding r emar ks:
Heidegger faced the denazification committee in 1945. It is not an exaggeration to state that many of the French were more interested in arranging meetings for Heidegger with leading foreign intellectuals than they were in learning the degree of his involvement with the politics of the Nazi party and their crimes against humanity. With the exception of Adolf Lampe, the one proverbial thorn in Heidegger's side, who opposed his rehabilitation and called for Heidegger to admit of personal responsibility, the committee was overall congenial to Heidegger. It was his fellow philosophers and former students that were the hardest on Heidegger, demanding his admission of guilt and expecting from him that which he never adequately provided, an explanation that served to fully justify his involvement with National Socialism, and beyond this, an apology for Auschwitz. They wanted 'a word that would finally clear Heidegger of being identified with Nazism,' and (Safranski 1999, 421) .
It is right to take Heidegger to task on the issue of Nazism and the Holocaust. I argue against the apologetics that Heidegger's involvement with National Socialism stemmed in great part from political naivete and the overestimation of philosophy's power to influence the development of Germany's history. Heidegger's students would perhaps agree with the following point, namely, that a naive complicity is complicity nonetheless.
So we return to the question that opened the essay: Is it fair to demand a consistency between the life lived and the life philosophized by the philosopher? I am torn between two positions. Heidegger undoubtedly made some horrendously bad moral decisions, which culminated in the Holocaust and Europe's destruction. One can argue, in a manner reminiscent of Sartre, that in affirming the politics of Nazism, Heidegger was at once affirming every single atrocity committed in the name of Germany during World War II.
However, as Richard Polt and others have rightly argued, if we dismiss his work on the grounds of Heidegger's politics and moral past, we must as well dismiss the work of all the other philosophers, and more, artists, poets, etc., who have also behaved immorally. I find it unrealistic to demand that the philosopher's life represent the embodiment of the work in its totality. However there must be some relation between thought and action, e.g.,
Heidegger's 'political' life, which is the involvement with Nazism, and the great philosopher of Being.
And it is between these two positions, between 'good and evil,' that Hong's film works so powerfully and effectively to remind us of the need to continue the careful and critical approach to Heidegger: The man, his life, and thought.
